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In this note, I wish to critique a proposal put forward by Camps & Uriagereka 
(2006; C&U) and Balari et al. (2011; BEA) regarding the study of the evolution of 
language. In particular, I intend to cast doubt on the connection they draw bet-
ween the computational properties of the language faculty and those involved in 
the conceptualization of a knot. In what follows, I will offer a rather negative 
commentary, in the sense that no alternative will be forthcoming. In fact, one of 
the main points of this paper will be that there is no phenomenon to explain at 
all; or at least it has not been properly formulated. 
 The general idea underlying what C&U and BEA propose is clear enough. 
Considering that the language faculty is underlain by a computational system 
that generates sound/meaning pairs, it ought to be possible to outline some of its 
computational properties. Furthermore, it is at least a possibility for some other 
cognitive domain of the human mind to share some of these very computational 
properties. If that is the case, C&M claim, such a domain would constitute a 
“cognitive base” that can be said to be in a “causal correlation” with the linguistic 
capacity (p. 35) ⎯ that is, the computational properties of such a ‘base’ would be 
parasitic on those of the language faculty. If this holds, the behaviors associated 
with this cognitive base could plausibly constitute indirect evidence for an 
“underlying linguistic prerequisite” (ibid.).  
 I pretty much doubt that such an inference is in fact sound, but let it stand 
for the sake of the argument. The specific behavior that engages C&U and BEA 
relates to the ability to tie a knot, a skill that must have originated in modern 
man, given that evidence for it in the fossil record ⎯ such as in the binding of 
projectiles to their shafts (C&U: 58) ⎯ is only present in the archaeology of Homo 
Sapiens (p. 45). Naturally, language and knot-tying are phenomena that at first 
sight appear to be completely unrelated, but C&U and BEA assure us that they 
may in fact share underlying properties. The overall argument is more or less as 
follows. According to mathematical linguistics, the expressive power of natural 
language is context-sensitive (or more accurately, mildly context-sensitive; Joshi 
et al. 1990); thus the computational system underlying language is of such power. 
Further, the mathematical structure of knots may be studied by employing the 
tools of Knot Theory, a subfield of mathematical topology. According to C&U, 
and citing a work from this literature (viz. Mount 1989), knots can only be created/ 
described by a context-sensitive system, a conclusion they take to be “not subject 
to rational debate” (p. 63). In a related manner, BEA conclude, citing another 
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study from Knot Theory (Hass et al. 1999), that determining whether a string is 
knotted or not is of a computational complexity comparable to the processing of 
linguistic expressions (p. 11). Given that evolution doesn’t, apparently, generate 
identical structures (C&U: 45), the ability to entertain and create knots may 
indeed be parasitic on computational properties of the language faculty.  
 Note, first of all, that in the above paragraph there is a leap from the 
expressive power of a language to the computational complexity of processing it; 
whilst these two factors are closely related, they should not be conflated. Such 
computational properties point, of course, to the classification of formal 
grammars and languages that Chomsky (1956, 1963) delineated ⎯ the so-called 
Chomsky Hierarchy.1 In those publications, Chomsky ranked different classes of 
formal languages (where a language is defined as a set of strings of symbols) in 
terms of the formal grammars (i.e. string rewriting systems) that are said to 
generate these languages. The expressive power of a grammar, then, refers to the 
precise set of strings that it can generate. Moreover, to say that a grammar is 
context-sensitive is to specify a particular set of constraints on the form of its 
rewriting rules that differentiates them from, for example, a context-free 
grammar. Concurrently, mathematical linguistics has also focused on the 
automata that are said to recognize each of the languages of the Chomsky 
Hierarchy (Hopcroft et al. 2007). In particular, it has been amply demonstrated 
that for each language class there is an automaton that recognizes all sets of 
strings of this class; in this sense, each grammar is equivalent to a specific 
automaton. In a perhaps more neutral vocabulary, one could state that automata 
and grammars specify languages.  
 Even though both automata and grammars describe the same reality ⎯ viz. 
a ranking of different language classes ⎯ there is a clear difference in perspective 
between employing a grammar and an automata in the study of computational 
properties.2 Indeed, it is no surprise that it is the latter construct that has featured 
more extensively in the study of the “rate of growth of the time or space” 
required to solve a problem (Aho et al. 1974: 2); that is, the study of the compu-
tational complexity of a problem is much more amenable for study by employing 
abstract machine devices such as automata than it is with a grammatical 
                                                
    1 It seems to me that this leap and the subsequent conflation of these two properties stems 
from the manner in which C&U and BEA interpret the Chomsky Hierarchy. In fact, these 
two publications follow the (in my opinion entirely misbegotten) ‘re-interpretation’ of the 
Chomsky Hierarchy Uriagereka conducts in chapter 7 of his 2008 book. This is rather 
surprising, for a number of reasons. First of all, even though C&U (p. 36) state that their 
description of the Hierarchy is based on Uriagereka (2008) ⎯ which they define, rather 
conceitedly, as a “current linguistic perspective” ⎯ this book was not even published at the 
time. More importantly, Uriagereka himself would surely admit that his re-interpretation is 
not only non-standard, but a very speculative exercise indeed. Why would these scholars, 
then, assume its validity as a framework upon which to draw a comparison between 
language and knot-tying? Be that as it may, the main mistake of this re-interpretation lies in 
Uriagereka’s belief that focusing on the different automata that specify the different lang-
uage classes gives you an account of structure generation, but this is quite simply not true; 
see infra for more details.  
    2 Hopcroft & Ullman (1969: 5) call these two perspectives the “recognition point of view” and 
the “generative point of view”. Similarly, Wintner (2010: 17) talks of the “dual view of lang-
uage”.  




formalism.3 If this is so, it is the case that the preoccupations of Automata Theory 
revolve (mainly) around discovering the inherent computational difficulty of 
various problems. 
 Consequently, when it is stated that natural language has a particular com-
putational complexity, this is supposed to refer to the inherent difficulty involved 
in processing linguistic structures. As it happens, what computational complexity 
is in fact involved in the processing of language is very uncertain. In a review 
article explicitly devoted to this question, and even though one of its section is 
titled “Parsing and recognition”, Pratt-Hartmann (2010) focuses his attention on a 
much narrower issue: the recognition problem. That is, given a grammar G with-
in a specific formalism F, the recognition problem aims to ascertain the amount of 
time and space that a Turing Machine would require in order to determine if a 
given string defined over the alphabet of G belongs to the language specified by 
G (Pratt-Hartmann 2010: 55). According to Pratt-Hartmann, the computational 
complexity of a grammar can only be determined within a specific formalism, 
and therefore different formalisms are likely to involve different measures of 
complexity. For example, the recognition of a context-free grammar specified in 
Chomsky normal form (see infra) can be achieved by the so-called CYK algorithm 
in time O(mn3), where m is the number of production rules, n is the length of the 
string, and O refers to the upper bound on the growth rate of this specific 
function (pp. 57–58). In other formalisms, the measures of complexity differ 
considerably: For a language represented with a tree adjoining grammar (TAG; see 
Frank 2004 for a brief description),4 the recognition problem can be solved in time 
O(n)6 (p. 60); with a government and binding formalism, the problem is in the class 
PSPACE5; and, finally, in the case of an Aspects-based grammar, the recognition 
problem is quite simply undecidable (p. 63).  
 At first sight, these results would appear to be far removed from the inter-
ests of a psycholinguist, and in a sense, they clearly are. After all, language pro-
cessing is not at all like the problem of determining whether a string is part of a 
language (putting aside the ability to judge the grammaticality of sentences to 
one side, obviously). That this is so follows, in my opinion, from the rather incon-
trovertible fact that formal language theory, strictly speaking, focuses on the 
properties of sets of strings of symbols, and not, or at least not as much, on the 
structural descriptions that are assigned to these strings. The issues at hand, how-
ever, are rather subtle and significant care must be employed in their discussion.  
 Consider a grammar formalized in (a simplified version of) Chomsky 
normal form; namely, a 3-tuple composed of a set of non-terminals, a set of 
terminals and a set of production rules. Assume that there is a ‘start’ symbol that 
can be expanded by employing one of the production (that is, rewriting) rules of 
the grammar. In turn, the resultant string ⎯ a composition of terminal and non-
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    4 Incidentally, the expressive power of TAG is mildly context-sensitive, which is argued to be 
the correct expressive power of natural language.   
    5 For a problem to be in the class PSPACE means that the Turing Machine would require a 
polynomial amount of space to solve the recognition problem.  




terminal symbols ⎯ can be further expanded by using other rewriting rules until 
a string consisting only of terminals is derived. The history of these rule appli-
cations is usually called a derivation, and it is possible to use a tree represen-
tation as a visual aid in order to depict a given derivation in graphic form. In this 
sense, the ‘derivation tree’ so devised would specify the structure of the string so 
generated.  
 Note, however, that there are in fact two structural descriptions at hand 
here, what Simon (1962) called a state description (an object as sensed) and a 
process description (an object as is constructed), respectively. While obviously 
related (a process generates an object), the internal structure of each construct 
may not coincide piecemeal. Perhaps it is the case that there is a direct connection 
between the applications of rewriting rules and the intrinsic structure of a 
linguistic object so generated ⎯ surely the devise of linguists ⎯, but such a nexus 
is not quite so transparent in other formalisms. As Miller (1999) points out, there 
is a difference between a ‘derived tree’ and a ‘derivation tree’ in TAG; whilst the 
former describes a linguistic object as postulated by the linguist (as in the syn-
tactic trees so common in many a linguistic paper), the latter specifies the oper-
ations that TAG employs (viz. the adjunction and substitution of ‘elementary 
trees’). Further, Miller (1999) proceeds, it is to the latter than we ought to focus if 
we are interested in the structures that TAG generates (usually called its strong 
generative capacity).6 That is, it is the derivation tree that specifies the structural 
descriptions of a formalism, not the derived tree. 
 My present point is that there is a difference between a string rewriting 
system as employed in mathematical linguistics and a tree rewriting system such 
as TAG in respect to what products these two systems return (cf. Miller 1999: 29). 
Strictly speaking, the rewriting systems of formal language theory generate 
strings (weak generation); they don’t generate structures. That is, there is nothing 
in the formalism of a rewriting system itself that even hints at the possibility of 
generating structure. Certainly, it is possible to modify such systems so that they 
generate structures, and this is precisely what obtains in systems such as those 
employed in a TAG. In my view, then, it is entirely correct to state that a rewrite 
rule generates a string to which a structural description is associated (surely an 
assignment that the linguist carries out; cf., again, Miller 1999: 2), but it is simply 
fantasy to suppose that they literally generate structures.  
 The same point applies to automata, which for present purposes can be 
described, in a somewhat simplifying manner, as being composed of an input 
tape, a control operation and a finite set of states (such as the initial state and the 
final, accepting state; Hopcroft et al. 2007: 45–46). It is certainly true that a proper-
ly characterized automaton would be able to accept a string of symbols of which 
we predicate a structure, but the automaton itself would not reflect in any way 
the internal constitution the set of symbols it receives is supposed to underlie. To 
suppose otherwise, it would quite simply be a figment of someone’s imagination; 
or worse, metaphor.7 
                                                
    6 Stabler (forthcoming) makes the very same point regarding the merge-based derivations of 
his minimalist grammars.  
    7 Hopcroft et al. (2007: 243–244) point out that a pushdown automaton (the automaton that 
specifies/recognizes context-free languages) can simulate the derivations of a grammar, in 




 Consequently, even if mathematical linguistics may have been able to 
study the computational complexity exemplified in various automata or gram-
matical formalisms to a significant extent, none of this may bear any resemblance 
to what goes on in the mind of speakers and hearers when they produce or 
process linguistic material. Admittedly, a hearer receives a chain of elements in a 
temporal sequence, but it is rather obvious that this input is not treated as if it 
were a string of symbols; rather, a structure is imposed on this material in some 
manner. Accordingly, the computational complexity of natural language pro-
cessing will have to consider properties of human psychology such as memory 
limitations, the strategies that are employed in parsing, the use of the immediate 
context and many other factors. All in all, it is simply not known what compu-
tational complexity our mental machinery exhibits in the processing of language. 
Consequently, a comparison with other computational tasks in these very terms 
seems to me rather flimsy. 
 Even if this weren’t the case, it is very easy to show that the mathematical 
theory of knots is in fact not informative about either the expressive power or the 
computational complexity involved in tying a knot. Further, it also has nothing to 
say regarding how to determine if a string is knotted. This is unquestionable the 
case because the subject matter of such a field involves something else altogether. 
A fortiori, no relation can at present be drawn between the ability to tie a knot 
and the conceptualization/processing of language. 
 As in any other subfield of mathematics, Knot Theory is a rather narrow 
and technical discipline, a factor that should make anyone skeptical of the possi-
bility of adapting it to the purposes of studying human cognition. As it turns out, 
the knots that Knot Theory studies bear no relation to real knots. Basically, a 
mathematical knot is a closed structure, an embedding of a circle into Euclidean 
3-space (Burde & Zieschang 2003: 1). Moreover, the main line of research in this 
field is extremely narrow; what these theorists attempt to do is figure out which 
two knots are isotopic and which are not, where two knots are regarded as 
isotopic if one of them can be transformed into the other by following step-by-
step moves. This, the knot recognition problem, involves working out the formal 
equivalence of two knots. A special case of this problem concerns the so-called 
‘unknot’, a closed loop without any knot in it, as shown on the left-hand side of 
Figure 1 below. The ‘unknotting’ problem, in turn, involves specifying an algo-
rithm that can recognize the unknot in a figure like the one found on the right-
hand side of Figure 1 (that is, convert the knot on the right-hand side into an 
unknot). 
 
                                                                                                                                 
the sense that the material the automaton is inputted can be manipulated in a manner that 
mimics the rule applications of the grammar (that is, the derivation). The same point 
follows: the structure that is assigned to the derivation (by the linguist) plays no role in the 
operations of such formalisms. Furthermore, the structure of a given derivation may not 
coincide with the structure of the object that is constructed. After all, simulation and 
mimicking do not stand on the same ground as a mechanism that is literally constructed as 
to generate structures, such as a tree rewriting system or an embedding mechanism like 
Merge (this situation is a bit like the attempt to model language comprehension — or indeed 
the whole of cognition— as a type of Bayesian inference; virtually anything can be so 
modeled, but this doesn’t imply that mental mechanisms in fact effect such inferences). 











Figure 1:  The unknot and a non-trivial knot 
 
Relevant to the issues I am unearthing here is the so-called Reidemeister moves, a 
set of well-defined combinatorial moves that can disentangle a knot without 
damaging it (note that these moves disentangle a knot, they don’t untie it). There 
are three such moves: twist/untwist; move one strand over another; and move 
one strand over/under a crossing (Manturov 2004: 12).  
 Naturally, none of this has anything to do with how you go about tying a 
knot, let alone the computational complexity required to do so. Perhaps unsure-
prisingly, the actual details of Knot Theory go completely unmentioned in C&U; 
its relevance to real-life knot-tying abilities just assumed. BEA do point out that 
Knot Theory deals with “elastic, closed, and tangled knots” (p. 11), but they go 
on to claim that “formal details aside” (as if they were of no importance), “the 
task of determining whether any string is knotted is known to have a complexity 
comparable to the one needed to process linguistic expressions” (ibid.; reference: 
Hass et al. 1999). And a bit later, they say, “(un)tying knots (or determining 
whether a tangled string is knotted) seems to require an underlying compu-
tational system of Type 1” (ibid.; Type 1 in the CH: context-sensitive). 
 There are two things at fault here. First is the claim that Knot Theory 
involves “determining whether a string is knotted”, something that is clearly not 
the case, as Knot Theory takes tied knots as its starting assumptions ⎯ indeed, 
this field’s sole concern is the equivalence problem outlined above. The other 
problem is to treat (un)tying a knot and determining if a string is knotted as if 
they are equivalent, but there are no reasons whatsoever to believe so. 
Furthermore, the reference BEA include in relation to this (viz. Hass et al. 1999) is 
clearly misrepresented. Rather, what Hass et al. (1999) proved is that an algo-
rithmic solution for the unknotting problem is in the complexity class NP, which 
is to say that the algorithm will define multiple ways of processing the input 
without specifying which one it will take, in polynomial time. Quite clearly, this 
has no relation to either the mildly context-sensitive expressive power of 
language or the complexity involved in language processing; moreover, it also 
has no relation to the complexity of (un)tying a knot.  
 Nevertheless, this is not to say that (un)tying a knot may well involve a 
non-trivial computational system, but we don’t have an account of this.8 At one 
point, BEA do envision what may actually be involved in making a knot; one 
must relate, they tell us, a segment of the knot with the background, and this may 
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demonstrated, not presumed.  




well involve “grouping and long-distance-like relations” (p. 11). This insight 
comes from C&U, in fact; therein, the authors briefly describe a possible transfor-
mation of a string into a knot by assigning a specific number to each segment so 
that these symbols can in turn be manipulated by a (context-sensitive) grammar. 
They don’t provide a proof of this, but the underlying idea is not incoherent. For 
example, Turing (1954) discusses a similar issue in relation to solvable and 
unsolvable problems in Knot Theory. As noted earlier, a knot is a closed curve in 
three dimensions, but it can also be accurately described, Turing tells us, “as a 
series of segments joining the points given in the usual (x, y, z) system of 
coordinates” (p. 585). Further, a set of symbols can be employed to represent unit 
steps in each coordinate direction (say, a’s and d’s for the X-axis, and so forth) so 
that transformation moves can be modeled by substitution rules of the pro-
duction systems variety. 
 These are, in fact, the terms in which I assume C&U claimed that Mount 
(1989) showed the necessity of a context-sensitive system to create knots; a 
conclusion, it will be recalled, supposedly “not subject to rational debate”. Some-
what amusingly, Mount (1989) turns out to be an unpublished computer manual 
for a program devised to assist mathematicians in the study of Knot Theory. At 
one point (p. 4), this author discusses the Reidemeister moves I outlined above, 
and remarks that the transformation of one knot into another may be reduced to 
a grammar problem, in precisely the terms Turing (1954) discusses. Later on, it is 
again remarked that “the Reidemeister moves could be rephrased as some kind 
of context-sensitive grammar” (p. 5).  
 Note what is actually being claimed here. First, that the Reidemeister 
moves could be modeled by a context-sensitive grammar; obviously, this is not a 
demonstration, but mere supposition. Secondly, such a supposition is exclusively 
meant to relate to the (narrow) purposes of Knot Theory; that is, Mount is won-
dering whether a production system may be employed to study the knot 
recognition problem. Again, this has nothing to do with the computational com-
plexity or expressive power of (un)tying a knot in real life. Nor could it be con-
strued as even suggesting such a connection. It is rather astonishing that the 
passing comments of an unpublished computer manual can become, on anyone’s 
reading, a conclusion “not subject to rational debate”. 
 In short, as it stands there is no fact of the matter regarding what relation 
there is, if there must be one, between the computational properties of the 
language faculty and whatever capacity underlies our ability to conceptualize 
and indeed tie a knot. This is not to say that there might not be a fruitful way to 
study such a relationship, but neither C&U nor BEA have provided any reason 
whatsoever, plausible or speculative, to believe that there is anything in need of 
explanation here.  
 In order to put an end to this brief examination, I should also add that C&U 
and BEA raise many other issues that are certainly worth discussing, such as the 
application of the Chomsky Hierarchy in the study of cognitive domains, the role 
of the different levels of analysis in such a study, and general features of mental 
architecture. In my opinion, there are significant shortcomings in the manner in 
which they treat all these issues, but this is not the place to discuss any of this; I 
do note, however, that I have done so elsewhere (Lobina 2012). 
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